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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A. 
OTTESON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. Case No. 15478 
RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA 
SUE MALONE, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
BY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
Defendants-Appellants contend that the Utah State Supreme 
Court was well within its province to reverse and remand the 
decision of the trial court and to instruct that the defendants-
appellants be permitted specific performance of the Lease and 
Option. 
Justice Maughn, writing for the court, well summarized the 
circumstances of the instant case: 
"There is no evidence of fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or over-reaching on the part of the defendants, 
and the plaintiffs are bound by the contract they engaged. 
The language of the Lease and Option was plain and unambiguo,;: 
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The parties had reduced an agreement to writing after 
negotiations, and after careful thought had been given 
to its formation and drafting. 
A written contract duly entered into should be 
regarded with some sanctity; and its commitments can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. In 
view of the situation here, where there were prior 
negotiations, the furnishing of the preliminary copy, 
as well as an amended one, with ample opportunity to 
read, (the defective hearing of Mr. Otteson thus becom-
ing unpersuasive) coupled with the later signing, and 
other circumstances shown, I cannot see wherein a fair 
and reasonable conclusion could be drawn that the Ottesons 
proved by clear and convincing evidence that they had not 
understood and agreed to the contract as they signed it." 
This is completely in keeping with the trial court's position. 
The trial court judge, on page 123 of the transcript, prohibited 
counsel for defendants from further probing matters of fraud, mis-
representation, and undue influence, and counseled as follows: 
"Well, haven't I said that I didn't think there was 
any undue influence or any fraud or any misrepresentation? 
I thought I said that had to be shown by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, and I found no such evidence here, so I don't 
think we need to concern ourselves about that." 
~-
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The lower court, while admitting that the proof should be 
clear and convincing, did not follow through with that standard 
in its decision. 
Despite an amount of contradictory testimony at trial, ther. 
still remained a large body of uncontroverted evidence supportet' 
by statements by both sides of the controversy. The following 
are a few examples: 
(1) Mr. Otteson testified that he had at least two 
ferences with the Malones regarding the Lease and Option 
before it was ever drafted. (Trial transcript, page 42) 
(2) Mr. Otteson testified that his eyesight was good 
and that he could read. (Trial transcript, page 43) 
(3) Mr. Otteson testified that both of the plaintiffs 
had, in fact, read the Lease and Option. (Trial transcript 
page 45 and 46) 
(4) Mr. Otteson testified that he discussed the 
first draft of the Lease and Option with the Malones. 
(Trial transcript, page 72) 
( 5) Mr. Otteson testified that both he and his wife 
read the second draft of the Lease and Option. (Trial 
transcript, page 82) 
The testimonies of both Mr. and Mrs. Malone affirm that the 
Ottesons had ample opportunity to understand what they were sigi.l~ 
Both appellants testified that the first draft of the instrument::. 
that le ase payment' returned specifically to clarify the provision 
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were to be applied to the purchase price. There can be little 
question that careful thought had gone into the formation of the 
contract. Mr. Bunnell, the attorney who prepared both drafts of 
the Lease and Option, testified that Mrs. Otteson contacted him to 
do the work and that he charged her for the services. The logical 
inference is that the respondents were as well protected in their 
dealings, if not better protected, that were the Malones. The 
Ottesons had Mr. Bunnell at their disposal throughout the final 
preparations of the contract; if they truly had any serious mis-
givings about what they had read, Mr. Bunnell could have readily 
answered their questions. 
Justice Maughn, in his opinion, speaks somewhat of the "sanctity" 
of unambiguous contracts. This concept is heavily buttressed by 
general contract law. In this regard, the authors of 49 AM JUR 2d 
Contracts, Section 149, pages 498 and 499, state: 
"It is the duty of every contracting party to learn 
and know its contents before he signs and delivers it, 
and if the contract is plain and unequivocal in its 
terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby. To permit a 
party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that 
he signed it but to deny that it expresses the agree-
ment he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it 
but did not read it or know its stipulations, would 
absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. This 
rule has been carried to the extent of holding that in 
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the absence of fraud or circumstances savoring a fraud, 
one entering into a contract which refers for some of 
its terms to an extraneous document, outside the contract 
proper, is bound also thereby, notwithstanding he admits 
to inform himself as to the contents of that document or 
the nature of those terms and conditions when it is pas-
sible for him to do so." 
The trial court permitted into evidence a great deal of 
testimony from the plaintiffs regarding what they thought the 
Lease and Option meant. Considering that the trial court had 
already barred the possibility of fraud, misrepresentation, and 
undue influence, and also considering that the Lease and Option 
was the final product of extensive negotiations between the part!' 
the court should have no consideration whatsoever given to the pa: 
testimony of the Ottesons. It is well substantiated by other ter1 
mony that the plaintiffs choice to sign the Lease and Option was:, 
spur-of-the-moment decision. It came only after weeks of negoti:· 
tions and two professionally drafted documents. If the defendan'· 1 
appellants cannot be protected in their contractual expectations 
after so forthright of an approach as that which they took in thi' 
case, one can only wonder what a party would have to do to formul: 
a valid contract. 
Perhaps the best definition of the illusive phrase, "Clear 
and convincing" evidence is to be found in Greener vs. Green_!!'.• 1:, 
P2d 194 (1949): 
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"But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a 
particular mind, it must at least have reached the 
point where there remains no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind 
which was of the opinion that it was convinced and yet 
which entertained, not a slight, but a reasonable 
doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion, would 
seem to be in a state of confusion." 212 P2d 205. 
The evidence supplied by the plaintiffs-respondents falls far 
below the standard required to invalidate an otherwise effective 
contract, particularly if onerejects that parole evidence which 
the trial court should have rejected. Considering the frequent 
conflict of testimony at trial, the Ottesons clearly failed to 
provide evidence which "reached the point where there remains no 
serious or substantial doubt". 
The Utah Supreme Court was bound by well-established principles 
of equity to look into the facts, as well as the law, of the present 
case and to determine if the evidence produced by the Ottesons was 
clear and convincing enough to overthrow a simple, forthright 
contract. The Supreme Court properly decided that the evidence 
was not of a magnitude to reach this requisite standard. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court was duty bound to reverse the decision of the 
trial court and to order specific performance of the Lease and 
Option. Consequently, the decision of the Supreme Court was 
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well-founded and in all aspects, proper. 
-"' RESPECTFULLY submitted this /_Cf -'day of October, 1978 . 
. ---)) 71< Ir(,- ( .?\ ) . 1~~7/r J(· ~-§'t R. ENSEN' '/ .1 ' 11 
Frandsen, Keller & J~nsen 
Professional Building 
90 West 1st North 
Price, Utah 84501 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this /f&day of October, 1978, I mailed three copies of 
the foregoing Petition in Opposition to Respondents' Petition 
for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Petition in Opposition to 
Petition and Brief for Rehearing by Plaintiffs-Respondents, by 
first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, to attorneys for 
respondents, Donn E. Cassity and J. Steven Newton, Romney, Nelson 
& Cassity, 136 South Main Street, Suite 404, Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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